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SCHREYER v SCHREYER: SHOULD
BRITISH COLUMBIA CARE?
MARK R. SLAY*
Many families in British Columbia and throughout Canada are
currently faced with the prospect of not being able to meet their
financial obligations. Not surprisingly, many find themselves
facing the prospect of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act1 (the “BIA”) supposedly provides the
opportunity for an orderly liquidation process, a degree of
protection for creditors, and an opportunity to give debtors a
fresh start. However, add marital property claims into the mix
with a bankruptcy and the supposed protection offered by the
BIA may have the effect of creating uncertainty as to what
property can be pursued upon a separation.
In a timely decision last year, the Supreme Court of
Canada had the opportunity to weigh in on the interplay of
insolvency legislation and family property division schemes
across the country. In Schreyer v. Schreyer,2 the Court had to
consider the perceived clash between family law and
bankruptcy law in seeking to resolve the claim by a wife denied
entitlement to her previously agreed-upon equalization
payment. In reaching the result, the Court offered significant
comment for legislative reform so as to avoid bankruptcy and
family law operating at cross purposes.

*

North Shore Law, North Vancouver, British Columbia.

1

Bankrupty and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA].

2

2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 SCR 605 [Schreyer].
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BACKGROUND
The Schreyers resided in Manitoba. They had a long-term
marriage of nineteen years prior to their separation. In 1997,
two years before their separation, the husband purchased a
farm from his parents. Title was registered solely in his name.
He financed the purchase by way of a mortgage.3 The parties
lived together on the farm.
Upon separation, a divorce action was brought in 2000.
Later in the same year, a consent order was entered into for a
valuation of their family assets. It would appear that the farm
was the most significant asset that either of them owned. The
valuation was to occur pursuant to the Manitoba Family
Property Act4 (the “FPA”).
However, before the valuation had been completed, the
husband made an assignment in bankruptcy. The wife was not
listed as a creditor and did not receive notice of the bankruptcy.
The husband was discharged from bankruptcy in November,
2002. Nonetheless, the valuation proceeded under the FPA.
The trial court confirmed an amount due to the wife of
$41,063.48 in 2007.
Of note, under the Manitoba Judgments Act,5 the
family farm was exempt from execution by creditors under the
husband’s bankruptcy. As such, the farm did not form part of
3

Interestingly, there is no mention in the decision as to whether the
wife guaranteed the mortgage. If she had, this may have amounted to
what Belinda Fehlberg, an Australian legal scholar, has identified as
“sexually transmitted debt” or “STD”: Belinda Fehlberg, Sexually
Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).

4

SM 2002, c 48, CCSM c F25

5

CCSM c J10.
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the bankrupt estate and the husband was thus able to continue
to own and live on the farm, both throughout and subsequent to
his discharge from bankruptcy. The husband was thus able to
benefit from the insolvency legislation. As it transpired, the
wife was not.
Upon appeal to the Manitoba Court of Appeal,6 it was
held that the model for the distribution of family assets in that
province was based on an equalization theory, as opposed to
the actual division of property. As such, the wife’s claim only
gave rise to a personal claim against the husband. It was a
claim “provable” in bankruptcy and, in the result, extinguished
by the husband’s discharge from bankruptcy. The Court
rejected the wife’s argument that her claim should survive the
bankruptcy on the basis that the farm was exempt property.
The wife appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
EQUALIZATION VS. PROPERTY DIVISION
Mr. Justice LeBel delivered the reasons for the Supreme Court.
The panel of seven justices was unanimous in dismissing the
wife’s appeal. The reasoning from the court below was upheld.
However, the Court embarked upon a considered analysis of
the effect of the bankruptcy upon defeating the wife’s valid
claim under the family law legislation. Mr. Justice LeBel was
quick to note:
Despite the apparent injustice of the outcome, it
is impossible to wash away the fact and problem
of the respondent’s bankruptcy.7

6

2009 MBCA 84.

7

Schreyer, supra note 2 at para 9.
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In the analysis of the Court, the problem lay with the
fact that Manitoba has adopted an equalization model of
property division. The equalization model requires one spouse
to pay to the other an amount in money or otherwise receive a
transfer of assets in lieu of that amount.
In contrast, the division of property model, which has
been adopted in British Columbia, gives rise to a proprietary or
beneficial interest in the assets themselves. The court found
that the equalization model created a relationship that was more
in the nature of debtor-creditor in that the creditor spouse
obtains a monetary claim against the debtor spouse.
The court also added:
Despite the proven wisdom of the policies
underpinning the insolvency legislation, it is
understandable that few appreciate the haircuts
or even outright losses that bankruptcies trigger.8
The court analyzed the structure and policy of the BIA,
noting that creditors will seek, where possible, to avoid its
application by seeking security on third-party guarantees.
Statutory exemptions may also apply; however, the court
recognized that the more exemptions there are, the less likely it
would be that the basic policy objectives of insolvency
legislation could be obtained.9
Mr. Justice LeBel was clear that:
... the interpretation of the BIA requires the
acceptance of the principle that every
claim is swept into the bankruptcy and that
8

Ibid at para 19.

9

Ibid at para 19.
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the bankrupt is released from all of them
upon being discharged unless the law sets
out a clear exclusion or exemption.10
Counsel for the appellant, no doubt getting a sense of
the way the judicial wind was blowing, argued that in fact the
Manitoba legislation created a ‘hybrid claim’, giving rise to
proprietary rights. However, the court rejected this on both
legal and policy grounds. First, it held that any proprietary
interest arose only at the remedial stage and only upon the
parties’ agreement or court order. Secondly, the court said that
to accept such an interpretation would be to interfere with the
clear policy choice that the Manitoba legislature made in
adopting the equalization model.
The court, after undertaking an analysis of what a
provable claim is, confirmed that the wife’s claim was one that
was provable in the bankruptcy. Even though the amount of the
claim had not been identified at the date of the bankruptcy, or
for that matter by the date of the husband’s discharge, it was
not so uncertain as to avoid the scope of the BIA. The court
affirmed:
A right to payment existed in this case from the
time of separation of the spouses, and hence
existed at the time of the bankruptcy.11
Only the quantum remained to be determined. As the claim of
the wife was not proprietary in nature, the husband’s
bankruptcy and discharge had the effect of releasing him from
further liability.

10

Ibid at para 20.

11

Ibid at para 27.
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APPLICATION OF SCHREYER IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA
As British Columbia is a property division jurisdiction, the
immediate dilemma faced by Mrs. Schreyer does not
necessarily arise. However, the issues arising within the case
do give rise to concerns here.
The division of matrimonial property in British
Columbia is governed by the Family Relations Act12 (the
“FRA”). Section 56(1) sets out as follows:
Subject to this Part and Part 6, each spouse is
entitled to an interest in each family asset on or
after March 31, 1979 when
(a) a separation agreement,
(b) a declaratory judgment under section 57,
(c) an order for dissolution of marriage or
judicial separation, or
(d) an order declaring the marriage null and void
respecting the marriage is first made.
The happening of any of the events referred to in
section 56(1) of the FRA is referred to as a ‘triggering event’.
Upon the occurrence of a triggering event, each spouse has an
undivided one-half interest in all of the family assets as tenants
in common. The interest each spouse is entitled to is vested at
that time. Further, the interest is not limited to an undivided
one-half interest in its value, but in the asset itself.13
Given the underlying nature of the property regime in
B.C., the immediate problem presented by Schreyer does not
necessarily arise. Nonetheless, there is still cause for concern
12

Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128.

13

Blackett v Blackett (1989), 22 RFL (3d) 337 (BCCA).
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with respect to the intersection of family law property rights
and bankruptcy legislation in B.C. These relate primarily to the
timing of the bankruptcy in relation to the occurrence of the
triggering event under the FRA.
Three areas of concern currently exist in this regard:
Bankruptcy Before a Triggering Event
B.C. courts have determined that, as the vesting of the spouses’
interests in family assets only arises upon a triggering event, a
prior declaration of bankruptcy will defeat any claim by a
spouse against family assets in the possession of the bankrupt
spouse.14
As in most bankruptcies, those assets will vest free and
clear in the trustee, subject to the claims of the secured
creditors and subject to any exemptions recognized under the
BIA.15
Bankruptcy After a Triggering Event
Before Division of Assets
An assignment in bankruptcy subsequent to a triggering event
does not adversely affect the vesting of an undivided one-half
interest as tenant in common in any family assets.16 The trustee
will still take the other half interest in the property pursuant to
section 71 of the BIA.

14

Biedler v Biedler (1983), 33 RFL (2d) 366, [1983] 5 WWR 129
[Biedler].

15

Walters v Walters (1985), 62 BCLR 334, 56 CBR (NS) 104 (BCSC).

16

Biedler, supra note 14.
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After Division of Assets
If assets have already been divided by either agreement
or court order, the trustee will be limited to only pursuing
property not otherwise dealt with.17
However, it should be noted that if the agreement or
order has given rise to a monetary obligation which has not
been perfected at the time of the bankruptcy, the claim will be
treated similarly to those of other unsecured creditors. This was
the precise problem faced by Mrs. Schreyer. It is not
uncommon in property agreements for one party to accept a
lump sum settlement in return for surrendering any claims
against family assets held by the other party. In such an
instance, reference must be made to section 67 of the BIA to
determine if property vested in the trustee is property which is
subject to a trust claim.
Exempt Property
Under the BC Court Order Enforcement Act18 (“COEA”),
provision is made for the allowance of exempt assets. Personal
property is dealt with under section 71 and real property is
dealt with under section 71.1. However, under both sections,
the exemptions are very small. The debtor is only allowed an
exemption of between $9,000 and $12,000, depending on area
of residence, in the proceeds of sale of their principal residence
(COEA Exemption Regulation 28/98).

17
18

Re Speklie (1996), 18 BCLR (3d) 229, 39 CBR (3d) 7 (BCSC).
Family Relations Act, supra note 12.
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BC FAMILY LAW ACT
After many years of discussion, albeit mostly not in the
legislature, the B.C. Family Law Act (the “FLA”) (Bill 162011) was given assent on November 23, 2011.19 However, it
has yet to be proclaimed. Coincidentally, as with the FRA,
property division is dealt with in Part 5 of the Act. Section 81
sets out as follows:
Subject to an agreement or order that provides
otherwise and except as set out in this Part and
Part 6 [Pension Division],
(a) spouses are both entitled to family property
and responsible for family debt, regardless of
their respective use or contribution, and
(b) on separation, each spouse has a right to an
undivided half interest in all family property as a
tenant in common, and is equally responsible for
family debt.
The obvious significant difference between the existing
language of the FRA and that of the FLA is when the
entitlement to an undivided interest in family property arises.
The FLA contemplates that this interest will arise “on
separation”. There no longer appears to be the need for a more
proactive triggering event such as an order for dissolution of a
marriage.
“Separation” is not defined in the new Act. However,
the FLA does provide, in section 3(4):
19

Bill 16, Family Law Act, 4th Sess, 39th Parl, British Columbia, 2011
(assented to 24 November 2011), SBC 2011, c 25, online:
<www.leg.bc.ca/39th4th/3rd_read/gov16-3.htm#part3div2>.
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For the purposes of this Act,
(a) spouses may be separated despite continuing
to live in the same residence, and
(b) the court may consider, as evidence of
separation,
(i) communication, by one spouse to the other
spouse, of an intention to separate permanently,
and
(ii) an action, taken by a spouse, that
demonstrates the spouse’s intention to separate
permanently.
Therefore, for the purpose of property division, parties
are not considered to have separated if, within one year after
separation, they have lived together for the primary purpose of
reconciliation. Such a period of reconciliation must total 90
days. However, the 90 days are not required to be consecutive,
as long as the period of reconciliation occurs within one year of
separation.
PRACTICAL CONCERNS
Trustees dealing with property in B.C. currently have to
consider if there are any outstanding or pending claims against
matrimonial property. Firstly, they need to determine the status
of any family proceedings including claims against property.
They will have to determine whether any orders or agreements
have been made or entered into.
Even if an order or agreement has been made, the
trustee should determine if it has been perfected, as it may
determine what property may yet vest in the trustee. The issue
of trust property will also have to be considered.
The trustee’s inquiries will become more broad once
the FLA is proclaimed. The trustee will have to determine if
the parties were separated at the time of the assignment into
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bankruptcy. Also, the trustee may have to monitor the marital
status of the parties for one year after the alleged separation.
Any reconciliation attempt in excess of 90 days during that
year may give rise to additional property vesting in the trustee.
This may affect the date on which a discharge can be granted in
British Columbia.
Spouses in B.C. must act expeditiously if they
anticipate that their partner is considering bankruptcy.
Obtaining a triggering event as soon as possible will make it
much easier to protect their claims against matrimonial
property. Once the FLA is proclaimed, it will be easier to
pursue claims as only a “separation” is needed. However, clear
and cogent evidence of that separation will likely be needed if
the spouse hopes to stave off claims by the trustee against
disputed property.
Certainly the pending FLA is likely to expand the
incidents of conflict between competing claims for marital
property under both family law and bankruptcy law provisions.
CONCLUSION
In Schreyer, the Supreme Court of Canada urged Parliament to
act quickly to clear up the likes of the loophole that gave rise to
the dilemma with which the Court was faced, noting that the
remedies under the BIA for claims against marital property are
limited. The court did hold out the prospect of pursuing a
spouse after a discharge from bankruptcy through spousal
support, as section 178(1)(c) of the BIA accords special
treatment for obligations arising for maintenance or support of
a spouse or children.20 However, the court recognizes that this
option may not always exist and it is a poor fallback position
when considering that it is a failing in the BIA to give effect to
the wife’s claim to her share of family assets.
20

BIA, supra note 2 at para 37.
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As family law practitioners know, these claims are
inherently difficult to pursue and even if successful may prove
empty if the bankrupt has no means to pay.
In a not so subtle prompt, the court noted that it has
been almost eight years since the Senate Standing Committee
on Banking, Trade and Commerce report on the BIA
recommended “prompt resolution” for such inequities.
Specifically, it was recommended that bankruptcy should not
stay or release a claim against exempt assets under either
model for dividing family property. Mr. Justice LeBel said:
More than seven years have elapsed since the
Committee issued its report. It seems to me that
this matter is ripe for legislative attention so as
to ensure that the principles of bankruptcy law
and family law are compatible rather than being
at cross purposes.21
In reaching the conclusion that it did, the Supreme
Court went to great lengths to point out that this is a case where
the law appears to trump common sense:
I do not doubt that an outcome like this one in
this appeal looks unfair, given that the
appellant’s equalization claim was primarily
based on the value of an asset – the farm
property – which was exempt from bankruptcy
and therefore not accessible to other creditors.
None of the underlying policies of the BIA
require that the appellant emerge from the
marriage with no substantial assets. Parliament
could amend the BIA in respect of the effect of a
bankrupt’s discharge on equalization claims and
21

Ibid at para 40.
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exempt assets. But the absence of such an
amendment makes the outcome of this case
unavoidable.22
One cannot help but agree with the Supreme Court that
until the necessary legislative changes are made, creditor
spouses must be wary of the BIA. Even in a province with a
division of property regime, like British Columbia, there is a
clear need for a review of the BIA to ensure that it does not
interfere with the prima facie property rights of spouses upon
separation. Given the continuing uncertain economic future in
Canada, Mrs. Schreyer is likely to have more company before
any review of or protection is offered her under the BIA.

22

Ibid at para 25.

